This paper identifies a structural break in core U.S. inflation Phillips curves such that oil prices contributed substantially before 1981, but since that time pass-through has been negligible. This characterization is robust to a variety of re-specifications and fits the data better than asymmetric and nonlinear oil price alternatives. Evidence does not support the hypotheses that declining energy intensity or deregulation of energy-producing and -consuming industries played an important role. Monetary policy did not itself become less accommodative of oil shocks, but may have helped create a regime where inflation is less sensitive to price shocks more generally.
IT IS WIDELY BELIEVED that commodity and other price shocks at least partially "pass through" into core inflation. The dramatic rise in oil prices over 1999-2000 places a premium on an accurate assessment of that passthrough: Figure 1 shows that in annual changes of quarterly averages, that spike is the third largest of the postwar period, about two-thirds the size of the largest oil shock in 1973 and far larger than the one in 1990. Since energy prices are a component of many Phillips curve models-the principal tool used by economists to explain inflation-those models can provide direct estimates of pass-through. However, the Phillips curve literature has largely ignored a substantial and growing body of evidence that oil prices have asymmetric and nonlinear effects on real activity, as well as that structural instabilities exist in those relationships. 1 In this paper, I evaluate the contributions of oil price changes to inflation in Phillips curve models that allow for various nonlinearities and structural breaks. I find that oil shocks contributed substantially to core inflation until 1981, but since that time pass-through has been largely absent. The econometric evidence for this regime-break result is highly significant and robust to different measures of inflation, resource pressure including the NAIRU, energy prices, and sample coverage. Two asymmetric and nonlinear oil price alternatives that have been widely used in the literature yield poorer fits, and exhibit the same patterns of parameter instability, as do the linear/regime-break specifications.
The period around 1981 was a time of dramatic change in world oil markets, major domestic markets for production and consumption of energy, and the U.S. monetary policy and inflation environment. Consequently, there are a number of potential explanations for why energy price pass-through might have declined sharply around that time. One is that the reduced impact of oil prices largely reflects a similarly reduced share of energy in the U.S. economy. Regressions that control for the oil share still exhibit coefficient instability and pass-through breakdown, suggesting that additional factors are driving the results. A second hypothesis focuses on the deregulation of key energy producing and consuming sectors around that time. Evidence reported here and elsewhere of similar declines in pass-through of non-oil price shocks casts doubt on this argument. The final hypothesis considered is that monetary policy become less accommodative of shocks generally, and of oil shocks in particular, under Paul Volcker's chairmanship of the Federal Reserve. Identified VAR estimates indicate that federal funds rate responses to oil price shocks were actually smaller in the post-1980 period than before, contradicting a direct change-inaccommodation story. However, the evidence is broadly consistent with the model and arguments in Taylor (2000) , where the degree of pass-through is a function of
FIG. 1. West Texas Intermediate Oil Price Year-over-Year Percent Change
2. The time-varying NAIRU estimate was kindly provided by Thomas Laubach, and computed as in Laubach (forthcoming) using PCE inflation, demographically adjusted unemployment, and oil prices as supply shocks (additional details are available on request). While the use of such a "generated regressor" will bias estimated standard errors, it does not seem feasible to conduct the stability tests below within the Kalman filtering/maximum likelihood framework used by Laubach, and, as shown in section 3, the results are not sensitive to alternative measures of resource pressure. the level of inflation and inflation expectations, which were brought down significantly by the change in monetary regime.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 estimates a basic Phillips curve relating inflation to its own lags, the unemployment gap, and oil price changes. The structural stability of this equation is explored in section 2, which contains the key results of the paper. Section 3 assesses the robustness of these results in a number of dimensions, and considers some asymmetric and nonlinear alternative specifications for oil prices. Section 4 evaluates some possible explanations for the results, and Section 5 concludes.
OIL PRICES IN STANDARD PHILLIPS CURVES
A typical Phillips curve specification is
where π t is the rate of inflation, UGAP is the deviation of unemployment from the NAIRU, x is a vector of supply shocks thought to shift the Phillips curve, and α(L), β(L), and γ(L) are polynomials in the lag operator. I begin by estimating a simple version with the following structure:
Inflation is measured by the chain-type price index for personal consumption expenditures less food and energy (core PCE). Expected inflation and inflation persistence are captured with lags of the dependent variable; the coefficients are not constrained to equal one but in practice are always close and imposing that constraint has little effect on the results. The unemployment gap is measured as the demographically adjusted unemployment rate less an estimated NAIRU that is allowed to vary through time. Figure 2 shows that this NAIRU series stays around 5-1/4 percent during the 1960s, rises gradually through the 1970s to a peak of about 6-1/2 percent in the early 1980s, and then declines steadily to 5-1/2 percent in early 2000, broadly consistent with the estimates in Gordon (1998) and Staiger, Stock, and Watson (1997) . 2 The x variables are a dummy for the Nixon wage and price controls, as in Fuhrer (1995) , and oil shocks as measured by the change in the producer price index (PPI) for crude oil relative to core PCE price inflation. Lag lengths on inflation are chosen following Fuhrer (1995) and Brayton, Roberts, and Williams (1999) , and on other variables according to simple t-and F-statistics. The data are quarterly and seasonally adjusted, and the estimation sample is 1962:II-2000:I.
I use PCE price inflation rather than the CPI because the drawbacks to using the latter in a time series analysis outweigh its greater popularity. The main disadvantages of the CPI are that it is a fixed-weight index, which incorporates a greater degree of substitution bias than chain-type indices, and that it has undergone several methodological changes in recent years. In addition, the standard CPI series include an error in the treatment of shelter before 1983 "that leads to a substantial exaggeration of the inflation rate, particularly during 1977 -1981 " (Gordon 1998 . Regression diagnostics strongly support the choice of PCE over CPI, but the results using the CPI are very similar, as shown in Table 3 and discussed in section 3.
Initial estimates of equation (2) are reported in the first column of Table 1 , with heteroskedasticity-and autocorrelation-consistent t-statistics in parentheses. The coefficient on the unemployment gap of Ϫ0.28 is highly significant, supportive of a Phillips curve relationship whereby unemployment and inflation are inversely correlated. This estimate translates a percentage-point-year of extra unemployment into a reduction in inflation of between 1/4 and 1/3 of a percentage point, which is within the range of conventional estimates. The coefficients on oil prices are small and far from significant, however, and the residuals exhibit evidence of serial correlation, nonnormality, and heteroskedasticity.
For comparison, estimates of a similar equation for overall PCE price inflation are reported in column 3. The unemployment gap enters with two lags, but the sum of the coefficients is similar to that in the core equation and they are also highly significant. Oil prices here enter contemporaneously, with a coefficient that is larger and significantly different from zero, which is not surprising since energy enters directly into the overall PCE index.
ISSUES IN THE SPECIFICATION OF OIL PRICE TERMS
The literature on the real effects of oil price shocks mentioned in the introduction suggests that the linear, constant-coefficient specifications in most Phillips curves may not accurately capture the effects of oil prices on inflation. That literature includes such diverse and refined positions as "oil prices by themselves do not have significant macroeconomic effects" (Bohi 1991) , "oil price increases matter but decreases do not" (Mork 1989) , "oil price increases matter if they are large enough relative to past experience" (Hamilton 1996) , and "the effects oil price increases are a Pesaran and Pesaran (1991, pp. 184-86) function of their size relative to their current degree of variability" (Lee, Ni, and Ratti 1995) .
There are several reasons why the macroeconomic effects of oil price changes might be difficult to identify. One is the time series behavior of oil prices themselves. As Figure 1 shows, before 1981 oil prices rarely fell in nominal terms, and movements in oil prices tended to be concentrated into abrupt level increases, due in large part to the regulatory price-and quantity-fixing schemes described in Hamilton (1985) . Prices then fell gradually from 1981 until 1985, collapsed in late 1985, and have swung widely in both directions through the present. It is only in the past fifteen to twenty years, therefore, that data has existed to differentiate many hypotheses about specification. An extreme example is asymmetry: until we observe price decreases, nothing empirical can be said about the effects that they might have.
A second difficulty in identifying the effects of oil price shocks on macroeconomic variables is the lack of a dominant theoretical mechanism. Researchers have argued variously that oil primarily affects the macroeconomy as an import price, through the terms of trade; as an input price, through the production function either by increasing costs or by increasing uncertainty and thus deferring irreversible investment; as a shock to the aggregate price level that reduces real money balances, and as a relative price shock which leads to costly reallocation of resources across sectors.
3 Finally, the possibility that monetary policy systematically responds to oil price movements makes it difficult to identify which is the cause of any resulting macroeconomic effect. Indeed, Hoover and Perez (1994) model oil price shocks as a dummy variable for the spike periods, and they are nearly coincident with the Romer and Romer (1989) monetary contraction dummies.
There is also empirical evidence that oil price terms are not stable in samples that include recent data. For example, Mork (1989) , Lee, Ni, and Ratti (1995), and Hooker (1996) show that Granger causality from oil prices (in log levels or changes) to output or unemployment deteriorates when data samples are extended past the mid1980s. Several researchers, including Lee, Ni, and Ratti (1995) and Hamilton (1996 Hamilton ( , 2000 , have argued that the greatly increased variability of oil prices after 1985 unmasked a misspecification, and that oil price changes must be run through complicated nonlinear and asymmetric filters in order to capture their macroeconomic impacts since that time. Mork (1989) , Dotsey and Reid (1992) , and Davis and Haltiwanger (1999) , among others, separate oil price changes into ups and downs, while Bernanke, Gertler, and Watson (1997) , Brown and Yücel (1999) , and Lown and Rich (1997) use the nonlinear and asymmetric series proposed by Hamilton (1996) . However, Hooker (1999) has shown that these transformations fall well short of reestablishing pre-1980s relationships between oil prices and output or unemployment.
Given this background, I begin the present investigation with tests for structural stability of the coefficients in equation (2), and consider some nonlinear and asymmetric oil price alternatives in the following section. Such tests should allow for un- Andrews (1993) and Andrews and Ploberger (1994) tests with F constructed according to Bai and Perron's (1998) equation (7). Numbers in parentheses are p-values calculated following Hansen (1997) .
certainty about where a breakpoint may lie due to the different oil market, regulatory, and monetary policy regimes in effect over the sample, as well as other factors that may have affected the relationships. Thus I use a battery of tests developed by Andrews (1993), Andrews and Ploberger (1994) , and Bai and Perron (1998) to test for the existence and number of structural breaks at unknown changepoints. The first column of panel A in Table 2 reports the Andrews and Andrews and Ploberger Sup, Exp, and Ave tests for stability of all of the coefficients in (2) over the middle 70 percent of the sample (the widest range that allows sufficient degrees of freedom to estimate the coefficients). The p-values, computed according to Hansen (1997) , all round to 0.00, indicating that all of the tests strongly reject the hypothesis of stability in favor of some fixed number of breaks. Since these tests compute F-statistics for the hypothesis of a break at each interior point, the pattern of those statistics provides some information on the nature of the instability. Given this strong evidence of a single break in equation (2)'s coefficients, I turn to the question of its location. Figure 3 is suggestive both in terms of which coefficients and which part of the sample: the scaled F-statistics from tests on just the oil price coefficients have the same shape as the all-coefficients values, but reach more than four times the 1 percent critical value for breaks in the 1980-1981 range. The Sup, Ave, and Exp tests in the second column of panel A confirm very strong evidence of a break in the oil price coefficients of equation (2), while a Bai-Perron test again accepts the null of one break against the alternative of a second.
Since the Bai-Perron test places the first break at the location of the maximal test statistic, these results suggest modifying equation (2) with a dummy-interaction term,
where D81 is 0 through 1981:I and 1 after. Although the Andrews-Ploberger tests cannot be implemented on dummy variable terms (they effectively interact dummy variables for different fractions of the sample with the covariates, leading to perfect 4. The equations analyzed in Table 2 omit the Nixon price control dummy for this reason. In addition, no F-statistic can be computed for a break at 1981:I in equation (3).
5. The equation's predictions for core PCE price inflation in 2000:II, using data available through Q1, are 5.08 percent using the pre-1981 coefficients and 2.15 percent using the post-1981 coefficients. collinearity), 4 it is possible to test the stability of the non-dummy coefficients in (3)-which amounts to an additional test of the hypothesis that there is one break in the equation and that it is in the oil coefficients at 1981:I. The p-values for these tests, reported in panel C of Table 2 , range from .25 to .79, indicating that the addition of oil price-dummy interaction terms indeed renders the equation stable.
The final check on the number and location of breaks is motivated by the pattern of test statistics in Figure 3 , which suggests that there might be additional breaks between 1974 and 1986. In the final panel of Table 2 , I re-run the Sup, Ave, and Exp tests on alternate versions of (3) where the dummy switches from 0 to 1 at 1976:I and 1986:I, respectively. As the table shows, there is only one case among the full-set tests where an additional break is detected-at 6 percent in the case with a break in 1986. However-consistent with the greater power of tests on smaller parameter sets-the oil coefficient-only tests all strongly indicate an additional break, each time at 1981:I. Taken together, the results in Table 2 comprise strong evidence that there is a break in the oil price coefficients of equation (2) at 1981:I and that equation (3) is structurally stable.
Parameter estimates of equation (3), reported in the second column of Table 1 , show a remarkable contrast to those in column 1. Adding the dummy-interaction terms dramatically improves the equation's fit, reducing the standard error from .80 to .66 percentage points of inflation, and removes the evidence of serial correlation, nonnormality, and heteroskedasicity in the residuals. More strikingly, the oil price coefficients are more than ten times larger than in column 1, very highly significant, and the interaction terms are nearly equal and opposite of them and also highly significant. Despite all four oil-related coefficients being very well determined, a test that they sum to zero, reported in the χ 2 EO line of the table, is easily accepted. A literal economic interpretation of these estimates is that before 1981, a doubling of oil prices translated into about three additional percentage points of core PCE price inflation, but since then pass-through has been negligible. Oil prices did in fact roughly double from mid-1998 to mid-2000, so if the pre-1981 coefficients were still applicable, core PCE inflation might have been nearer 5 percent than the 2 percent that prevailed in early 2000. 5 The data since 1981 weigh heavily enough, however, that constrained regressions yield oil price coefficients near zero with only marginal statistical significance (see column 1). For comparison, the approximately 2.5 percentage-point-years of unemployment below the NAIRU over 1998 -2000-to many, the biggest threat to price stability-contributed less than a percentage point to core inflation, according to equation (3).
Continuing the comparison with the overall PCE price inflation equation, the Sup test p-value shown at the bottom of column 3 also provides strong evidence of instability in the oil price coefficients, with the largest F-statistic occurring at 1988:II.
6. The CPI-U-RS data is only available back to 1978 (which would preclude tests of stability at 1981); the combination with CPI-U-X1 extends the series back to 1967. The results using the standard core CPI, available from 1957, were very similar, although the residuals were less well-behaved.
Adding a D88 dummy-interaction term again produces a highly significant coefficient that is opposite in sign from the now much larger and more significant oil price term, and renders the oil coefficients stable. However, the improvements in the equation's fit and behavior of residuals are more modest, and a test of the hypothesis that the oil price and dummy-interaction terms are equal and opposite produces a borderline p-value of .10.
ROBUSTNESS OF THE RESULTS
Both the stark nature of the structural break in the core inflation equation and the fragile nature of oil price terms in much of the real effects literature call for a thorough assessment of robustness. In this section, I verify that similar results obtain with alternative inflation, economic activity, and energy price variables, with different NAIRU estimates, and over different sample periods. I also test whether asymmetric and nonlinear responses to oil price shocks, popular hypotheses in the real effects literature, help explain the results found here. Rather than performing the full battery of Andrews/Ploberger and Bai/Perron tests for the many variations of (2) and (3) below, I rely on Sup tests for stability of each equation's energy price terms.
A. Other Inflation Measures
The consumer price index less food and energy (core CPI) provides a direct alternative to the core PCE price index. In addition, I use the chain-weighted GDP price index, which provides useful checks on the results in several dimensions: it is available over a longer sample, from 1947; its coverage-all domestically produced goods and services-is very broad; and it falls somewhere between a core price index and an overall one in terms of energy share, because it includes domestically produced but not imported energy.
As mentioned above, the standard core CPI series mismeasured shelter before 1983 and incorporates several methodological changes made in recent years. I use a methodologically consistent version of the core CPI recently constructed by Rich and Rissmiller (2000) , which combines the BLS's core CPI-U-RS and CPI-U-X1 series. 6 Estimates for the core CPI equation, in the first two columns of Table 3 , are very similar to their PCE counterparts. Although the CPI equation prefers two lags of the unemployment gap, their sum is similar to the core PCE unemployment coefficient. The oil price coefficients in the CPI equation are larger than those in the PCE equation but not significant, and the Sup test again indicates strong evidence of a break at 1981:I. When a D81 dummy is interacted with the oil price terms, the oil coefficients are again much larger and more significant, they statistically sum to zero with those interaction terms, and the fit of the equation is significantly improved.
Furthermore, the behavior of the residuals is improved, and there is no evidence of additional instability in the oil price coefficients.
In the first GDP price index Phillips curve, reported in column 3 of the table, the unemployment gap enters with one lag, the lagged oil price is not significant, and the Andrews test indicates a break in the oil price coefficient at 1981:I with a p-value of .08. Augmenting the equation with a D81 interaction term, in column 4, again renders the oil coefficient stable and produces much larger and more significant oil price and interaction coefficients that sum to zero. As with the overall PCE inflation equation, however, the fit is only marginally improved. The GDP price index equation thus seems to exhibit some of the aspects of core and some of overall inflation equations, consistent with its falling in between a core and an overall price index in terms of energy share.
B. Robustness to Measure of Resource Pressure and Energy Price
This subsection considers two pairs of regressions to assess whether the results obtained thus far are sensitive to different measures of the unemployment gap and of energy prices. These equations, and all of those that follow in the paper, return to using core PCE price inflation.
Three measures of economic activity are typically employed in Phillips curves: unemployment gaps, output gaps, and capacity utilization rates. Unemployment and output gaps require calculation of the NAIRU and potential output, respectively, both 7. Orphanides and van Norden (1999) show that output gap revisions are often very large and occur after many years. of which involve a number of complicated issues and are subject to large ex post revisions.
7 By contrast, Gordon (1989) advises, "if you want a variable that can be taken off the shelf from the government statisticians without any fine tuning, the Fed's capacity utilization rate captures the impact of the business cycle on the inflation process without the need for any adjustment or decomposition at all" (p. 213). The main drawback of this approach, and a reason for focusing on unemployment gap Phillips curves (in addition to their primacy in the literature and textbooks), is that the capacity utilization series does not begin until 1967.
The first pair of regressions simply follows Gordon's suggestion. Estimates of (total) capacity utilization Phillips curves, in the first two columns of Table 4 , are very similar to the estimates in Table 1 despite the differences in measure of resource pressure and sample coverage. The coefficient on capacity utilization is positive and highly significant, and the two lags of oil prices are not significant and exhibit a MARK A. HOOKER : 551 structural break in 1981. When interaction dummies are included, they and the oil price terms are all highly significant, the equation's fit is substantially improved, and the estimated oil*D81 coefficients are statistically equal and opposite of the oil price coefficients. Finally, the oil price coefficients are now stable and the residuals well behaved.
As a second alternative to a time-varying NAIRU unemployment gap, the regressions reported in columns 3 and 4 include the (demographically adjusted) unemployment rate level along with an intercept, implicitly imposing a constant NAIRU. They also replace the PPI oil price with the broader PPI series for "fuels and related products and power." Despite these two changes, the results are quite similar to those obtained thus far. The coefficients on unemployment are somewhat smaller (particularly in dummy-interaction equations), but are still highly significant. The energy price coefficients are not significant at the 5 percent level, and are unstable according to the Andrews test, with the largest rejection again coming at 1981:I, and the residuals exhibit strong serial correlation. When D81 interaction terms are added, the first energy price term and its interaction counterpart are both highly significant, they are equal and opposite of each other, and the equation's fit is improved. Moreover, the energy price coefficients are now stable and the residuals are well behaved.
Taken together, these results suggest that the estimates in Table 1 are not sensitive to the choice of inflation measure, resource pressure including NAIRU estimate, energy price, or sample coverage. The following subsection examines whether nonlinear and asymmetric effects of oil prices on inflation fit the data better than linear/regime-break specifications.
C. Incorrect specification: Asymmetric and Nonlinear Oil Price Effects?
A potential alternative explanation for the core inflation pass-through result is asymmetric responses to oil price shocks, as advocated in real-side equations by Mork (1989) , Dotsey and Reid (1992) , and Davis and Haltiwanger (1999) among many others. Oil prices first started falling in nominal terms around 1981, so if oil price increases and decreases have asymmetric effects, that might show up as a structural break in a linear specification at about that time. In fact, Mork (1989) argued that allowing for asymmetry in the responses of output to oil shocks resolved an apparent structural break in 1986, when oil prices dropped sharply.
Estimates from an equation where positive and negative oil price changes are entered separately, in a specification analogous to those in Mork (1989) or Dotsey and Reid (1992) , are reported in column 1 of Table 5 . None of the oil price coefficients are significantly different from zero, they are not structurally stable, the break statistics again reach their maximum value at 1981:I, and the equation is misspecified according to residual autocorrelation. Column 2 then adds D81 interaction terms to each of the positive and negative terms. Here again, the oil price increase and increase-interaction coefficients are highly significant, the constraint that they are equal and opposite is easily accepted, and the oil coefficients are no longer unstable according to the Sup test. Likewise, the equation displays a markedly improved fit with no residual autocorrelation. The oil price decrease and decrease-interaction terms are not significantly different from zero, but this is not surprising: before 1980, there were very few oil price decrease observations, and the evidence obtained thus far indicates that oil price changes after 1980-whether positive or negative-do not affect core inflation.
The next two columns turn to Hamilton's (1996) nonlinear (and asymmetric) transformation of the oil price, which was used in Phillips curves by Lown and Rich (1997) . His "net oil price increase" series is the percentage change from the highest oil price reached over the past four quarters, if positive, and zero otherwise. The estimates in column 3 show that this oil price provides a moderately better fit than the positive/negative distinction in column 1, with the second lag coefficient significant at the 10 percent level. However, the oil price coefficients are not structurally stable Mork's (1989) oil price change and zero; NOil is the corresponding minimum of zero and that oil price change. NOPI is Hamilton's net oil price increase, described in the text. See notes to Table 1. with a break once more indicated at 1981:I, and the equation exhibits strong evidence of autocorrelation. The estimates in column 4 show yet again that interacting D81 dummies leads to much larger, more significant, and stable oil price coefficients, statistically equal and opposite dummy interaction terms, and an improved fit with well-behaved residuals. The evidence in Table 5 supports the hypothesis that core inflation became much less sensitive to energy price changes around 1981, rather than the alternative that oil prices have asymmetric or nonlinear effects on core inflation. The following section explores three potential explanations for this result.
POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS
The first candidate explanation is that the dramatic reduction in pass-through of energy prices to inflation reflects the reduced energy intensity of the U.S. economy. The second points to deregulation of crude oil and natural gas markets, and of the energy-intensive trucking and airline industries, in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The third argues that monetary policy became significantly less accommodative of oil shocks around 1980, damping their pass-through. Available evidence conflicts with each of these explanations.
A. The Declining Energy Intensity of the U.S. Economy
This hypothesis may be evaluated quantitatively with data on the energy share in GDP, which I measure using the Department of Energy's estimates of energy consumption per dollar of GDP (an annual series, in thousands of BTU per $1996 of GDP, reported in its Annual Energy Review, Table 1.5). The AER data run through 1999; I interpolate to a quarterly frequency and extrapolate the series for the first quarter of 2000 assuming that oil consumption grew at the rate of real GDP. As Figure 4 shows, U.S. energy intensity declined fairly steadily over the sample, with a small rise in the late 1960s and a more rapid decline in the 1970s. The series is converted to an index equal to 1 in 2000:I and then interacted with the oil price terms in the regressions, so the estimated coefficients may easily be compared to those in other tables.
Initial estimates, shown in column 1 of Table 6 , are fairly similar to those in Table  1 : the coefficients on oil prices (now interacted with oil intensity) are a bit larger, at .16 and .14 compared with .10 and .12, and the second lag now has a marginally significant t-statistic. However, there is strong evidence of a structural break in the oilintensity coefficients, with the maximum value again at 1981:I, and some evidence of poorly behaved residuals. Interacting D81 dummies with the oil-intensity terms, in column 2, generates the familiar pattern of results: the oil-intensity coefficients are much larger, more significant, and stable, the dummy interaction terms are statistically equal and opposite and highly significant, the fit is considerably improved, and the residuals are well behaved. These results suggest that the abrupt decline in pass-8. This measure of energy intensity is a volume rather than a value measure. An earlier draft reported very similar results using expenditures on petroleum, which are driven mostly by oil price changes, as a percentage of nominal GDP.
9. I thank Calvin Schnure and Ken Simonsen for making me aware of these arguments and some of the regulatory practices.
through of oil prices to core inflation is over and above that which would have been expected from the decline in the U.S. economy's use of oil. 
B. Deregulation of Energy and Energy-Related Industries
It has been suggested that regulatory practices in crude oil and natural gas markets, and trucking and airline industries, supported the pass-through of energy prices to inflation until deregulation of those industries in the late 1970s and early 1980s. For example, in many cases oil-burning utilities had rates set as a function of costs and were prohibited from shifting to cheaper energy sources like natural gas, making the power they sold very sensitive to oil price fluctuations. Similarly, many airline and trucking fares had cost-plus arrangements and restrictions on price competition. Theoretically, more rigid markup practices should lead to larger one-time changes in the price level after a shock rather than higher inflation, but a persistent inflation process may translate larger and more widespread price increases into more inflation. Such practices may also make it more difficult for monetary policy to resist accommodating a shock.
The industry-specific nature of this deregulation hypothesis suggests an indirect test based on the sensitivity of inflation to non-energy price shocks over time. Sur- prisingly, most non-energy price shock series that I considered-including the core intermediate and core final goods PPIs, core non-oil import prices, and the Commodity Research Bureau's spot commodity price index (an index of twenty-three agricultural and industrial prices that includes no energy products)-did not enter regressions significantly in any parts of the sample, rendering the tests inconclusive.
10 However, the producer price index for crude materials less food and energy (CCPPI, for core crude PPI) does enter significantly in the equations in columns 3 and 4 of Table 6 .
The estimates for the other variables are similar to those reported above, while the CCPPI coefficient in column 3 is marginally significant and considerably larger than those on oil prices. However, both the oil and CCPPI coefficients exhibit strong evi-556 : MONEY, CREDIT, AND BANKING 12. Dating the breakpoints is an informal by-product of the tests; standard errors for the dates (which would allow a test of whether 1976:IV is significantly different from 1981:I) do not exist. If the break in the CCPPI coefficient is imposed at 1981:I rather than 1976:IV, the coefficients are still equal and opposite, but are smaller in absolute value and less significant.
13. Clarida, Galí, and Gertler found that "interest rate policy in the Volcker-Greenspan period appears to have been much more sensitive to changes in expected inflation than in the pre-Volcker period" (2000, abstract) . Taylor (1998) dence of instability; the maximal F statistic for oil prices is again at 1981:I, but for CCPPI it occurs in 1976:IV. 11 The results in column 4 show that interacting a D76 dummy with CCPPI produces the familiar pattern of results: the CCPPI coefficient becomes much larger, more significant, and stable, with a dummy interaction term that is highly significant and statistically equal and opposite of it.
12 (The same pattern of oil price coefficients obtains as well.) The equation's fit is also considerably improved, and the residuals better behaved, although there is still evidence of serial correlation.
Several recent studies have also reported evidence consistent with reduced passthrough from non-oil commodity prices after around 1980. Blomberg and Harris (1995) found that the ability of commodity prices, including the non-oil CRB index, to predict core inflation in a VAR framework weakened considerably starting in the mid-1980s. Similarly, Garner (1995) found weaker relationships between several commodity price indexes (that generally included oil but with relatively small weights) and inflation in the 1983-94 subsample than in the full 1973-1994 sample. Finally, McCarthy's (1999) estimates of exchange rate pass-through to consumer prices during 1983-1998 are less than half the rate for 1976 -1982 (cited in Taylor (2000 ).
These results suggest that the diminished pass-through of price shocks to inflation after 1980 is not a phenomenon specific to the energy sector, but rather is more general. Thus, while deregulation of energy and downstream industries may have played a role, it is unlikely to have been a principal cause.
C. The Switch to a Less Accommodative Monetary Policy Regime
Economists of many persuasions agree that monetary policy ought to be a candidate explanation for any sustained change in the inflation process. Indeed, it is frequently argued that relative price changes, even those as large as the OPEC oil shocks in the 1970s, should only be inflationary if accommodated by monetary policy.
Evidence does support the popular perception that monetary policy became significantly less accommodative of inflation around 1980. For example, the large "Taylor rule" literature, which estimates equations for the federal funds rate as a function of deviations of output and inflation from their trend and target levels, typically finds much larger coefficients on inflation deviations after 1980 than before.
13 Whether monetary policy became less accommodative of oil shocks themselves, however, requires a more direct investigation.
14. The beginning of the sample is determined by availability of the federal funds rate. The VAR incorporates the variable ordering and coefficient restrictions in BGW, and contains real GDP, the GDP chain-weight price index, the CRB commodity price index discussed above, Mork's (1989) crude oil price (not separated into ups and downs), the federal funds rate, the three-month Treasury bill rate, and the tenyear Treasury note yield. Bernanke, Gertler, and Watson (BGW, 1997) Hamilton and Herrera (2000) . The first is that the short lag lengths (six months) used in BGW are inconsistent with most of the literature on the real effects of oil prices-which tends to find that the strongest effects are at the fourth quarterly lag-and are soundly rejected in tests that consider longer lags. The second is that BGW's estimated monetary policy responses to oil shocks, with a doubling of oil prices leading to an 800 basis point increase in the federal funds rate, are implausible and raise important Lucas critique issues. Hamilton and Herrera find that longer lags produce more realistic impulse response functions, so I estimate a version of the BGW model with four quarterly lags on a sample spanning 1955:III-2000:I.
14 The full set of coefficients and those on oil prices each produce break F-statistics that are well above the 1 percent critical value for the Sup test, and both reach their peak in 1979:II. Therefore, I split the sample at that point and compute impulse-response functions for the two subsamples in addition to full sample estimates. Figure  5 plots the responses of the funds rate over the subsequent twenty quarters to a permanent 25 percent increase in oil prices (a 100 percent increase at an annual rate). Surprisingly, the response is far larger in the earlier sample, with a one percentage point rise in the funds rate two quarters after the shock that is largely reversed in the following two quarters. The estimates for the post-1979:II period, and for the full sample, show much smaller responses that fluctuate around zero for the whole fiveyear horizon. (BGW found similar results with their data set broken into thirds: their funds rate responses to oil shocks over 1966 -75, 1976 -85, and 1986 -95 indicate a mild tightening, a more severe tightening, and a slight easing, respectively.)
These estimates indicate that monetary policy has responded less rather than more aggressively to oil price shocks in recent decades, which suggests that the causality may run the other way: oil prices have a smaller impact on inflation, so monetary policy need not respond to them as aggressively. The question of what caused the reduction in pass-through in the first place remains unanswered, however. Taylor (2000) puts forth the view that the declines in pass-through are due to the low inflation environment, which in turn was largely a result of the change in monetary policy regime. While the evidence in this paper is consistent with Taylor's story-it is very parallel to the reduced exchange rate pass-through that Taylor cites-the imprecision in measuring expected inflation and defining the "inflation environment" preclude a formal test.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This paper estimates the effects of oil price changes on U.S. inflation in a Phillips curve framework, allowing for some of the asymmetries, nonlinearities, and structural breaks that have been found in the literature on the real effects of oil price shocks. It finds strong evidence of a structural break, with oil price changes making a substantial direct contribution to core inflation before 1981 but little or no passthrough since that time. The structural break specification provides a better fit to the data than do several asymmetric and nonlinear specifications popular in the literature on the real effects of oil price shocks, and is robust to different measures of inflation, resource utilization including NAIRU estimate, energy prices, and sample coverage.
The many changes in energy markets and the U.S. economy around 1980 provide a number of candidate explanations for this dramatic fall in pass-through. However, evidence does not support any of the three investigated. The decline in the energy intensity of GDP does not seem responsible, as a sharp reduction in the sensitivity of inflation to oil prices remains in regressions that control for it. If deregulation of key energy-producing and -consuming sectors was an important factor, then decreased pass-through ought to be concentrated in energy prices, but evidence indicates similar declines in pass-through from non-oil price shocks around that time. Finally, monetary policy appears to have displayed smaller, rather than larger, responses to oil price changes in the period since 1979, despite a greater sensitivity to changes in inflation. The evidence in this paper is consistent with Taylor's (2000) argument that declines in pass-through were caused by the move to a low inflation environment that in turn resulted from the monetary regime change, but the possibility that passthrough was damped by other factors cannot be ruled out. 
